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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the ability of a number of dierent ordered probit models to
predict ratings based on rm-specic data on business and nancial risks. We investigate models
based on momentum, drift and ageing and compare them against alternatives that take into
account the initial rating of the rm and its previous actual rating. Using data on US bond
issuing rms rated by Fitch over the years 2000 to 2007 we compare the performance of these
models in predicting the rating in-sample and out-of-sample using root mean squared errors,
Diebold-Mariano tests of forecast performance and contingency tables. We conclude that initial
and previous states have a substantial inuence on rating prediction.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that ratings agencies provide an independent assessment of the risk of a counter-
party using information on the balance sheet, the prot and loss account and private information
on the management of the entity, summarized using a rating scale running from the highest rat-
ing AAA to the lowest CCC. The analysis of credit risk, probability of default and ratings has a
long pedigree (see Horrigan (1966), Pogue & Soldofski (1969); Pinches & Mingo (1973); Kaplan
& Urwitz (1979) and Kao & Wu (1990)); this literature has sought to explain the relationship
between ratings and nancial or business risks. Applications have been made to a wide range of
sovereign countries, nancial companies and corporations (Blume et al. (1998); Amato & Furne
(2004); Rosch (2005) and van Gestel et al. (2007)). We expect ratings to be closely related to
the default risk of the country or company being rated, or the instrument being issued, although
rating agencies themselves claim to rate `through the cycle', and seek to avoid correlation with the
business cycle. It is clear that frequent changes in ratings are undesirable from the point of view
of long-term investors, governments and rms, whose nancing options and costs may be aected
by ratings through regulation, covenant provisions on loans or bonds, and reduction of access to
money and derivatives markets (see Pagratis & Stringa (2009)).
Examination of ratings behavior over time by Blume et al. (1998) documented that credit
ratings, on average, became worse as increased volatility in corporate creditworthiness during the
mid-1980s and early 1990s was accompanied by downward momentum in credit ratings. This
extended an approach developed by Carty & Fons (1993) to measure ratings drift. Because a rm
initially rated as AA on the basis of its risk characteristics was rated lower than AA subsequently
Blume et al. (1998) and others concluded that the standards of ratings agencies over this period
became more stringent. But ratings can deteriorate because rms have lower credit quality, if
they becoming more leveraged for example, and later studies by Amato & Furne (2004) identied
no secular change in rating standards in data from 1984-2001. Rather, their results implied that
ratings changes were driven by changes to business and nancial risks, not by cycle-related changes
to rating standards. Cantor & Mann (2003) conrmed that rating reversals are rare even at a ve-
year horizon. Yet, the large number of rating downgrades during the US corporate credit meltdown
in 2001{2002 and 2007-9 casts some doubt on the extent to which ratings see through the cycle.
2
There are also other dynamics at work in ratings. Carty & Fons (1993) and Lando & Skodeberg
(2002) found evidence that there is momentum in ratings, since a rm that had previously been
upgraded faces a dierent probability of upgrading in the next period to a rm that was previously
downgraded. Carty & Fons (1993) and Lando & Skodeberg (2002) also found evidence of ageing
in ratings, which occurs when the current rating is dependent on the duration that the rm spent
in the previous rating category. The debate over the determinants of ratings is ongoing, and this
paper makes a comparison of alternative models for forecasting the current rating class of a number
of US bond issuing rms.
Despite the many competing arguments that seek to explain ratings, it is agreed that ratings
do seem to show state dependence. This contravenes the assumptions of simple stationary Markov
chains often used to make predictions of ratings transition, although more complex models involving
mixtures of Markov chains, or models with non-Markovian features like drift, momentum and ageing
can be more informative than simple Markov models. In this paper we examine the role of state
dependence in predicting credit ratings by rst estimating the determinants of credit ratings using
linear measures of business and nancial risks from the balance sheet. We then allow for the
possibility that some variables inuence the rating in a nonlinear manner, supplementing the linear
model with nonlinear terms following van Gestel et al. (2007). We also introduce models of drift,
momentum and ageing. Then we allow the model to register the initial rating of the rm and
the previous actual rating of the rm creating persistence through state dependence (initial and
previous states). This marks a break with previous studies that have used ordered probit or logit
models without the inuence of previous rating history on the current rating. We show that there is
very considerable evidence that allowance for state dependence in ratings improves the prediction
of the current rating. Even by the standards of the earlier models that evaluate the relative
performance of alternative models in terms of an informal goodness of t indicator, the model with
state dependence shows superior performance in predicting the current rating. When we examine
the predictive ability in- and out-of-sample using measures of the root mean squared error, the
Diebold & Mariano (1995) prediction test and evaluate the proportion of correct predictions using
Merton's correct prediction statistic (Merton (1981)) we nd that the state dependence model is also
better on this measure than alternatives. The alternative models we consider include momentum,
drift and ageing hypotheses for predicting ratings.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the extensive literature on credit risk,
probability of default and ratings, Section 3 describes the methodology we use in this paper, Section
4 presents the data used in our empirical analysis, and Sections 5 and 6 report the results, model
predictions and forecast evaluations. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Literature
The literature on credit risk and default prediction, of which analysis of credit ratings is a part,
is vast. This literature review will set our analysis in context, while necessarily leaving many of
the details for the reader to follow up in the references cited. We start with a discussion of credit
risk and default probability before we consider the analysis of ratings, ratings transitions and the
relationship between ratings and cycles.
2.1 Credit risk and probability of default
If we suppose that the probability of default can be connected to the characteristics (covariates) of
the rm recorded in the matrix Xit then one approach to analyze the probability of default is the
logit regression. Taking yi = 1 as the default outcome observed for rm i, then the probability of
default is dened as Pr(yi = 1jXit) = (+Xit) = exp(+Xit)1+exp(+Xit) , where  and  are matrices of
parameters to be estimated. The estimation can be undertaken using maximum likelihood methods
where the likelihood function is dened as
L =
NY
i=1
Pr(yi = 1 j Xit; ; )yi Pr(yi = 0 j Xit; ; )1 yi
Anderson (1984) shows that this approach is closely connected to discriminant analysis. It is
assumed we can observe rms that survive (yi = 0) and those that default (yi = 1), and can see
what their characteristics are in a training sample of data. If these groups have dierent means,
0 and 1 respectively, a common variance covariance matrix, , and 0 and 1 are the respective
densities, then using the discriminant function d(X) = X 0 1(0   1)  12(0   1)0 1(0   1)
allocates rms to group 1 if d(X)  logK, and group 1 otherwise based on their information form
a second sample of data. This discriminant function ensures that the costs of misallocating the
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rm to the `wrong' group are minimized. Anderson (1984) shows that following this approach
is equivalent to estimating a logit regression where we restrict Pr(yi = 1jXit) = ( + Xit) =
exp(+Xit)
1+exp(+Xit)
; with  = log( exp(q1)1+exp(q1)) + (Xit  
0+1
2 )
0 1(0   1) and  =  1(0   1): Due
& Singleton (2003) and Lando (2004) point out that the Z-score derived by Altman (1968) is
essentially a form of discriminant analysis, where the Xit covariates are nancial ratios from the
rm's balance sheet recorded through time. An example of the use of discriminant analysis for
assessing default probability is given by Lo (1986), who found that this method was as successful
as a logit model in discriminating between bankrupt rms in a sample of US rms. Lennox (1999)
found a similar result on a sample of 949 UK rms between 1987-1994, in which the covariates
included rm-specic variables such as leverage and cash ow as well as macroeconomic indicators
such as the business cycle.
Another way authors have considered the probability of default is to refer to the hazard function.
If we consider the hazard as the probability of defaulting in time t, given that the rm has survived
up to this time, then if we think of s as a default time, which has a density function f(:) and a
distribution function F (:) then the hazard function is h(t) = f(t)1 F (t) . If the survival function has
a logistic distribution then the hazard model would result in a logistic model of the probability of
default. The most commonly used examples of hazard models, however, are proportional hazard
models, often depending on rm covariates. Due & Singleton (2003) document that a hazard
function h(t) = h0(t) (+Xit) has two elements, representing the baseline hazard, h0(t), common
to all rms, and an element,  (+Xit), that depends on the rms' characteristics, Xit: The precise
functional form of the baseline hazard can be parametric or non-parametric (see for example Lando
(2004) pp. 84-87). An example of this approach with reference to credit risk is found in Shumway
(2001), which compares the performance of duration models with static methods such as logit
and probit models. Using identical covariates to Altman (1968), he showed that a duration model
outperformed the logit using the same information set. Chava & Jarrow (2001) extended Shumway's
model to include market data on capitalization, excess return in the stock market, and the volatility
of stock market returns and further improved on the performance over the Altman model.
Due & Singleton (2003) argue that the main dierence between qualitative response models,
discriminant analysis and duration models based on the hazard function, is their implied default-
time densities conditioned on the same information set, Xit: The duration models estimate the
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probability of default through time, while the other methods refer to the probability in a single
period (or succession of unconnected periods). Our own model makes use of the probit estimator,
using the information set, Xit, but allows for the inuence of the initial state (rating) and the
previous state in various ways.
2.2 Ratings and ratings transitions
When considering a discrete ratings system it can be useful to make the assumption that ratings are
characterized by Markov chains in modeling the ratings process. This is true even if the histories
reveal non-Markov chain properties, since the assumption provides a useful benchmark against
which to compare the actual ratings history (see Lando (2004), pp 88-89) If we use a discrete time
Markov chain then the estimation of the likelihood is similar to a multinominal logit estimator.
The discrete model assumes that there are i = 1; 2; :::N rms in t = 1; 2; ::; T time periods such
that ns(t) is the number of rms in state s, ns;s 1(t) is the number of rms that transit from
state s to state s   1, and therefore Ns(T ) =
PT
t=0 ns(t) is the total number of rms recorded
at the beginning of the transition period, and Ns;s 1(T ) =
PT
t=0 ns;s 1(t) is the total number of
rm transitions observed from state s to state s   1 in the entire time period. Further assuming
independence of ratings transitions across rms, and that the probability of observing a transition
path from x0; x1; x2; :::xT is px0;x1 ; px1;x2 ; :::pxT 1;xT (by virtue of the Markov chain assumption),
the log likelihood function is
X
(s;s 1)
Ns;s 1(T ) log ps;s 1 s.t.
SX
s=1
ps;s 1 = 1
resulting in an estimated probability of ps;s 1 =
Ns;s 1(T )
Ns(T )
; which has a close similarity to the
multinomial logit estimate of the transition probability.
An alternative to the stationary Markov assumption is to assume that rms can be classied
as `movers' or `stayers' in line with the model of Frydman et al. (1985). Instead of the Markov
chain dening the probability of transition from x0; x1; x2; :::xT , there is a denition px0;xT =
SI + (I   S)MT , where I is the identity matrix, M is the (K  K) transition matrix and S =
diag(1; 2; ::; K) with i dening the proportion of stayers in state i = s; s   1; :::;K in time 0.
Some rms will not leave their initial state, and these we denote ni(t). The term ni(0) refers to
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as the number of rms initially in state i = s; s   1; :::;K at time 0. There are some rms that
transit to other states ms;s j but some `movers' end up back where they started, ms;s: As shown
in Frydman et al. (1985) and Lando (2004) with a large enough sample, the estimate of the movers
that return to their initial state isms;s =
Ns;s(T ) Tni(t)
Ns(T ) Tni(t) and the proportion of stayers in each state is
i =
Ns(T )
ns(0)
: This nal term has the intuitive interpretation of the total number of rms recorded at
the beginning of the transition period in state s, divided by the number of rms initially in state s.
Frydman et al. (1985) apply this method and the stationary Markov chain model to 200 revolving
credit accounts over a period September 1978 to May 1981, and suggest that the mover-stayer
model has the advantage of modeling some individual heterogeneity that improves the prediction
compared to the Markov chain model.
It is entirely possible to construct ratings transition equations that depend on observed tran-
sitions as a proportion of rms in each rating category, but this assumes that time periods are
homogenous. Under this assumption the transitions behavior that is observed can be used to cre-
ate a generator, ; that provides the probability that a rm in rating category s will be in rating
category s  1 at some time t, which is s;s 1: If the default state is s = K, then s;K is the prob-
ability of default. There is no reason to maintain the assumption of time homogeneity however,
and Kavvathas (2001) has allowed the generator to be a function of market data. One reason for
time homogeneity to be rejected is the observation that probability of transition depends on the
inuence of the business cycle or the age of the bond.
2.3 Ratings and cycles
If ratings vary across the cycle or depend on the age of the bond then Markov chain assumptions
break down (Lando (2004), see pp 97). This introduces the issue of ageing, momentum and drift.
If the rating transition depends on the period of time that the bond has been in a particular rating
category, then it is subject to ageing, as documented by Carty & Fons (1993), Lando & Skodeberg
(2002) and Kavvathas (2001). These authors and Behar & Nagpal (1999) and Bangia et al. (2002)
also note that the rating transition is dependent on the previous rating category, which suggests a
momentum eect on ratings. Empirically, this has been found to be particularly true for downgrades
but less true for upgrades. A further analysis of ratings over time has addressed the question of
ratings drift, which can be a result of variations in the standards of ratings agencies in assigning
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ratings or a variation in credit quality of rms seeking ratings. The literature by Blume et al.
(1998), Cantor & Mann (2003) and Amato & Furne (2004) refers to this issue. We have noted
that ratings agencies claim to `rate through the cycle' but the existence of ageing, momentum and
drift in ratings require us to modify our Markov chain assumption and allow for state dependence
in ratings through introduction of the previous rating or the initial rating into an ordered probit
model. Nickell et al. (2000) have introduced a business cycle state variable (peak, normal and
trough) into the covariates driving the ratings transitions, depending on whether the GDP growth
rate was in the upper, mid range or lower end of the observed growth rates in the sample period.
Allowing for these inuences they found that US rms rated A or higher did not have transitions
that were aected by the cycle, but for lower rated rms (Baa and below) there was an inuence
of the cycle.
Another way to model the cyclical eects of the economy on output, defaults and credit spreads
is introduced by Koopman & Lucas (2005). They model the business cycle and the measures of
actual defaults of rms and credit spreads as an unobserved components model along the lines
of Harvey (1989), with strong reliance on the time series dimension of ratings data, in contrast
to the cross-sectional properties discussed by Nickell et al. (2000) and Bangia et al. (2002). The
model uses real chained GDP growth, the default rates of US rms and contains US business failure
rates per 10,000 companies over the period 1927{1997, and the credit spread based on Moody's
yields on Baa corporate bonds and the yield on government bonds with a maturity exceeding 10
years. The cyclical and irregular components of the series are removed when the model is estimated
using a Kalman lter. Focusing on the time series properties of their data the Koopman & Lucas
(2005) found `strong co-cyclicality' between spreads and defaults and between spreads and growth
at business frequencies of 6 years, and when they examined longer frequencies of 11 years, there
was also signicant correlation between growth and default cycles.
In a recent paper Frydman & Schuermann (2008) tie Markov models, the mover-stayer model
and the literature on non-Markov properties of ratings together. As we mentioned above, the
conventional time homogenous Markov model implies that all rms with the same rating migrate
from that rating at the same speed. But the non-Markovian features of ageing, momentum and drift
detected in ratings do not follow this principle. But if the model is modied to allow the rms with
the same rating to migrate at dierent speeds, forming a mixture of two time homogenous Markov
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chains for example, then these features can be accommodated in a model with Markov properties.
Frydman & Schuermann (2008) consider a situation where there are two generators,  and G,
 =  G and   = (1; 2; 3; :::; K) where s = 1; :::;K are the states or ratings classications. A
proportion s of rms with rating s, migrates according to the rst Markov chain with generator 
and the remainder (1  s) migrates according to the second Markov chain with generator G: The
Markov chains dier in the rate at which the rms leave state s, but rms have the same probability
of entering another state. It is also the case that in the special case where s = 1 for all s = 1; :::;K
the model collapses to a stationary Markov model (since   = (1; 1; 1; :::1) = IK) and where s
= 0 for all s = 1; :::;K the becomes the mover-stayer model. Frydman & Schuermann (2008)
consider the predictive ability of such a model, dependent on an information set zt  which includes
information about the realizations of the mixture process. Under a standard time homogenous
Markov assumption the information set zt  would not be relevant to predictions of ratings or
ratings transitions, but in this mixture model the rating history, including the past ratings and the
initial rating, as well as the period of time in a rating state, all matter. We use this observation to
propose a number of alternative models that consider the initial rating , the lagged rating and the
time within a rating state as explanatory variables for the ordered probit model we use below. We
also include rm-specic variables to explain the rating state.
3 Methodology
In this section we explain how we use rm-specic characteristics to predict credit ratings.1 First, we
discuss the ordered probit analysis employed in the literature with linear and non-linear explanatory
variables. Second, we note the state dependence in ratings and ensure that our model giving the
probability that an issuer will fall into a particular rating category accounts for the information
in the past history of ratings. Finally, we explain how the evaluation of ratings using tests of
predictive performance can quantify the ability of our model to predict ratings using information
in the explanatory variables discussed above.
1That is not to say that credit agencies use this method to generate ratings - for a detailed statement of the
process used by agencies see van Gestel et al. (2007) Figure 1. - but the academic literature has connected the ratings
assigned by agencies to rm characteristics using these methods.
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3.1 An ordered probit model of ratings
We begin our analysis with the standard academic framework for relating long-term default ratings
to nancial data on the balance sheet using a limited dependent variable model, used by Kaplan
& Urwitz (1979); Blume et al. (1998); Amato & Furne (2004); Pagratis & Stringa (2009) and van
Gestel et al. (2007) among others. Credit ratings can be viewed as resulting from a continuous,
unobserved creditworthiness index, yit. Each rating corresponds to a specic range of the credit-
worthiness index, with higher ratings corresponding to higher creditworthiness values, therefore,
credit ratings are discrete-valued indicators and have an ordinal ranking.
Following Maddala (1983) we can state that the unobserved index of credit quality, yit; is dened
for the ith rm, i= 1,. . . , N in each time period t= 1,. . . , T . This ordinal response can be modeled
through an ordered probit model of the following type:
yit = +Xit + it (1)
where Xit denotes a set containing k explanatory variables for rm i and year and  is a kx1 vector
of unknown parameters to be estimated, and it is the disturbance term which is assumed to be
normally distributed. The model includes time dummies for each year to capture year eects, and
industry dummies to control for the unique inuence of factors aecting specic industrial groups.
In our data yit is not observed, thus we use credit ratings assigned to rms, which can take
M values for the observed variable, yit, that are assumed to be related to the latent variable y

it
through the following observability criterion:
yit = m if m 1 < yit  m for m = 1; : : : ;M (2)
for a set of parameters 0 to M , where 0 < 1 < ::: < M , 0 =  1 and M =1. Assuming a
standard Normal distribution for it the conditional probabilities can be derived as:
Pr(yit = m) = (m  Xit)  (m 1  Xit) (3)
where (:) is the standard Normal distribution function. We can evaluate the above probabilities
for any combination of parameters in the vectors , . In our analysis we consider a pooled probit
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model that does not require strong exogeneity assumptions.
Thus the model denes the categorical variable y = 1, 2,.., 7 which is the rating assigned to
each rm, and without loss of generality we can record AAA as 1, AA as 2, A as 3 . . . CCC as
7.2 It connects the characteristics of the rm recorded in the matrix Xit to the rating of the rm
through the estimated parameters,  of the model and the cuto values, 0 to M .
The standard approach to modeling credit ratings is to take the variables in the matrix Xit as
a linear measure of the rm-specic characteristics, as we have represented the model above. But
recent work by van Gestel et al. (2007) shows that non-linear transformations of the same rm-
specic characteristics can allow for the fact that an x% change in a variable will not necessarily
have a linear eect on the credit rating. We therefore take a nonlinear transformation of the
variables in Xit apply the hyperbolic tangent transformation x ! f(x) = tanh(x) to oor the
impact of large negative or positive values of these ratios. These terms will be used to determine
the eect of nonlinearities in the rating prediction function. We select the non-linear terms by
determining whether we can reject the hypothesis that the coecients on these terms are jointly
zero i.e.H0 : NL = 0 in a model of the form:
Pr(yit = m) = (m  Xit   f(Xit)NL)  (m 1  Xit   f(Xit)NL) (4)
where f(Xit) is a matrix of variables transformed by the hyperbolic tangent transformation,
and NL is the vector of coecients.
Other tests of momentum, ageing and drift are included by adding as regressors a) a dummy
variable for rms have had a previous upgrade and a dummy for rms have had a previous down-
grades. If momentum eects of the kind described by Carty & Fons (1993) are present in our
sample the former should be insignicant and the latter positive and signicant. b) evidence of
ageing, measured by the number of periods in the previous rating state, following a change in the
rating state. We expect this variable to have a negative and signicant coecient. c) evidence of
drift, measured by the coecient estimates on the dierence in the percentage of rms experiencing
an upgrade minus the percentage of rms experiencing a downgrade for each calendar year.
2In practice we put AAA and AA together as one category, and B and CCC together as one category due to the
small number of observations in the highest and lowest classes.
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3.2 An ordered probit model with state dependence
Several authors have noted that ratings do not respond immediately to current information; for
example, Odders-White & Ready (2006) suggests that rating agencies can be slow in responding
to new information. This may occur for reasons inherent in the rating setting process within the
credit ratings industry, or due to the rating through the cycle approach that attempts to separate
ratings from cyclical factors. But when ratings are compared in successive time periods there is
evidence of serial correlation (see Carty & Fons (1993) and Gonzalez et al. (2004)), which may
reect a degree of temporal interdependence. Pagratis & Stringa (2009) show that bank ratings
tend to be sticky and therefore state dependence appears to be very important in predicting certain
types of ratings.3
As result of these observations we extend the model to take into account the persistent nature
of ratings. The more general specication that we estimate is derived from Wooldridge (2005) and
Greene & Hemsher (2008), and includes previous rating states in our ordered probit framework in
order to capture state dependence. It can be written as:
yit = Xit + yit 1 + yi0 + it (5)
where Xit is a 1xk vector containing k explanatory variables and  be a kx1 parameter vector.
yit 1 and yi0 are indicators of the rm's rating in the previous year and the initial year respectively
and  and  are parameters to be estimated. it is the disturbance term. Assuming a normally
distributed error structure with zero mean and unit variance the probability of observing the
particular category of rating m reported by rm i at time t is given by:
Pitm = Pr(yit = m) = (m  Xit   yit 1   yi0)  (m 1  Xit   yit 1   yi0) (6)
Estimation of the ordered probit model with state dependence can be performed by maximiz-
ing the log-likelihood function using standard numerical techniques. Since we estimate a model
3We do not attempt to determine the source of the persistence in ratings, therefore we do not oer an assessment of
the serial correlation, stickiness or staleness of ratings. Our purpose is to use the persistence to improve the forecasts
of ratings assigned by the credit ratings agencies.
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including lagged values we need to take account of the problem of initial conditions. Thus, we
estimate the model allowing for state dependence and accounting for the initial conditions prob-
lem (Heckman (1981) and Wooldridge (2005)). We adopt the procedure suggested by Wooldridge
(2005) to deal with the problem of initial conditions. This problem is due to the generic feature of
the panel that rms (or individuals) inherit dierent unobserved and time-invariant characteristics
which aect outcomes in every period. The ordered probit models are estimated using maximum
likelihood estimators which are available in standard econometric software.
The main advantage of the more general ordered probit model is that it explicitly addresses
the issue of state dependence. State dependence provides a casual link between the probability
of obtaining a rating in year t and the past realization of the rating in the previous year and the
initial state. We expect to nd that the t of the model improves with the introduction of state
dependence in the rating, but we can also allow for nonlinearities to enter this model as we have
done in earlier models:
Pitm = Pr(yit = m) = (m  Xit   f(Xit)NL   yit 1   yi0) (7)
 (m 1  Xit   f(Xit)NL   yit 1   yi0)
We compare these models against a range of alternatives to provide a comparison of models with
dierent dynamic features. These alternatives include a model that only considers the inuence of
the previous rating on the current rating and another variant that allows for the initial rating on
the current rating. Both of these models are linked with the work of Carty & Fons (1993), Behar &
Nagpal (1999) and Bangia et al. (2002). We consider these models with and without the inclusion
of rm characteristics. Another variant that we consider is a model that allows for state dependence
but uses the average rating over the previous three years as a determinant of the current rating,
instead of the previous rating. This provides us with a range of alternative models of ratings that
can be compared in- and out-of-sample regarding their predictive ability.
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3.3 Comparative predictive ability
The relative performance of ordered probit models of ratings is typically evaluated in terms of an
informal goodness of t indicator, by comparing predicted and observed ratings in contingency
table. Hence Blume et al. (1998) and Amato & Furne (2004) report tables with predicted ratings
on the horizontal axis and actual ratings on the vertical axis; they then comment on the numbers
of rm-year observations on the diagonal. Pagratis & Stringa (2009) comment on the proportions
of predictions that are above, equal to, or below the Moody's actual rating for ratings within
some range e.g. Aaa-Aa2, Aa2-A3 etc. van Gestel et al. (2007) compare the performance by the
dierence in the number of notches between the predicted and actual ratings irrespective of the
direction.
We rst report root mean squared errors (RMSE) of all the competing models against the base-
line model. As a rule, models with the smallest errors tend to have superior predictive ability to
other competing models. However, the dierence between two forecasts may not be statistically
signicantly dierent from zero. In order to make comparisons of forecasts across all compet-
ing models we produce Diebold-Mariano (Diebold & Mariano (1995)) signicance levels [hereafter
DM].4 This test should provide us with information whether the dierence between two forecasts
from competing models is statistically signicantly dierent from zero. In particular, we are able
to test whether the errors of the competing models were statistically dierent from those of the
baseline model. The null hypothesis of equality of expected forecast performance as a function of
their errors, g(eit) is E[g(e1t) g(e2t)] = 0. If we dene dt = g(e1t) g(e2t); t = 1; 2; : : : ; n the sam-
ple mean of the series, d = 1n
Pn
t=1 dt; is the natural basis for comparison in a test. The series dt is
autocorrelated and DM show that the variance of the mean of dt for h-step ahead forecasts is given
by V ( d)  1n [0 + 2
Ph
k=1 1k], where k is the kth autocovariance of dt. The Diebold-Mariano
test is then S = dp
V (d)
. Under the null hypothesis the statistic has an asymptotic standard normal.
If the calculated statistic, S, is positive and signicant we can reject the null hypothesis that the
errors of the two forecasts are not signicantly dierent.
As well as reporting the values for DM statistics, we also consider the modied version of this
test statistic that corrects for its tendency to be over-sized, using the adjusted DM test statistic
4Chortareas et al. (2011) follow a similar methodology to assess the forecasting performance of several models
using exchange rate data.
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suggested by Harvey et al. (1997) [hereafter HLN], which has better small-sample properties. The
values for the HLN statistic are calculated as follows: S = [n+1 2h+n
 1h(h 1)
n ]
1
2S, where S is the
original DM statistic, n and h denote the number of forecasts and the forecast horizon respectively.
Once again, the test is calculated under the null hypothesis of equivalence in forecasting accuracy
and the calculated statistics are compared to the critical values of the Student's t-distribution with
n-1 degrees of freedom.
In addition to DM and HLN statistics, we refer to a contingency table of actual and predicted
ratings to give a numerical assessment of predictions in and out-of-sample in order to compare the
alternative models. The proportion of correct predictions we denote, SC, which is the sum of all
diagonal terms divided by the total number of observations SC = 1T
TX
t=1
1(q^t = qt) where q^t refers to
the predicted rating and qt is the actual outcome. We also use the Merton (1981) measure used in
Henriksson & Merton (1981), Pesaran & Timmermann (1994) and Kim et al. (2008) that modies
the SC measure in order to avoid good predictions from the `stopped clock' problem. Let CPj be
the proportion of the correct predictions made by q^t when the true state is given by qt = j. From
the denition of conditional probability, CP is computed as CPj =
1
T
TX
t=1
1(q^t = j)(qt = j)
1
T
TX
t=1
1(qt = j)
and the
Merton's correct measure denoted CP is given by CP = 1J 1 [
J 1X
j=0
CPj   1] where J is the number
of categories, and   1J 1  CP  1. In the contingency table CP is the unweighted average of
CP j 's minus one (to correct for the stopped clock phenomenon). The CP j 's are calculated as the
proportion of correct predictions divided by the total of each row. This modies the measure of
predictive ability to discount the inuence of the dominant outcome. Only when a predictor is
accurate for all categories will it obtain a high CP score.
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4 Data
4.1 Data sources
We use Fitch's database as our source for data on issuer default ratings.5 This database provides
information on the long-term rating assigned to each issuer as well as the date that the rating became
available, thus we can record the continuous rating history for each rm. In keeping with the normal
practice in the literature, we categorize our rms into rating categories without consideration of
notches (i.e + or -). Amato & Furne (2004), emphasize that this categorization considers large
cumulative changes of ratings rather than small movements notch by notch, and avoids generation
of rating categories with very few observations. We consider seven rating categories, ranging from
AAA to CCC, which are assigned numerical values, starting with 1 to AAA, 2 to AA,. . . , 7 to CCC.
Following Calomiris et al. (1995) we group AAA and AA together creating a `super-investment
grade' category, and similarly we group CCC and B ratings together. This allows for the fact that
there are only a few AAA and CCC ratings. Table 1 reports the ratings distribution of rms in our
sample. We can observe that the number of observations increases over time and that our sample
is mainly dominated by observations with A and BBB ratings. This information can be used to
compare the predicted rating from the static model with the actual rating, and the lagged and
initial values can be used as inputs to the model with state dependence before making a similar
comparison between the predicted and the actual rating.
We use Fitch's Peer Analysis Tool to extract rm-level accounting data. Corporate histori-
cal data for all rms rated by Fitch are available from 2000 onwards. Following selection criteria
commonly used in the literature, we exclude companies that do not have complete records on our
explanatory variables and rm-years with negative sales and prots. To control for the poten-
tial inuence of outliers, we exclude observations in the 0.5 percent upper and lower tails of the
distribution of the regression variables.
Our combined sample contains data for 273 rm-years yielding a total number of 1845 annual
observations. Firms in our sample actively operate between 2000 and 2007 in a variety of sectors
such as manufacturing, utilities, resources, services and nancial services. The panel has an un-
5Fitch ratings are generally available since 1995 and can be downloaded either from Fitch's website or from other
commercial databases such as Bloomberg. Firm-level data from Fitch's Peer Analysis Tool are available from 2000
onwards.
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balanced structure with the number of observations on each rm varying between two and eight.
Our sample presents two characteristics that make it especially appealing for our analysis. First,
it includes both investment grade and high yield bonds, where previous studies mainly restricted
their attention to investment grade bonds, neglecting the eects of speculative grade bonds.6 This
is particularly benecial since rms with high yield bond issues are more likely to be characterized
by adverse nancial attributes and weak balance sheets, hence, these rms may be subject to more
intensive monitoring. Second, the sample spans a wide range of sectors of the US economy. We
use data for ve industries: manufacturing, utilities, mining, services and nancial services. This
classication corresponds to the sectoral breakdown of the entire US economy using the Datastream
level 3 sector indices, constructed according to the 1999 FTSE reclassication. Ratings dier with
an industry's fundamentals; industries that are in decline, highly competitive, capital intensive,
cyclical or volatile are inherently riskier than stable industries with few competitors, high barriers
to entry, national rather than international competition and predictable demand levels. Therefore,
an issuer in a high-risk industry is unlikely to receive the highest rating possible (AAA) despite
having a conservative nancial prole. We include industry dummies to allow for this feature in
the data.
The distribution over the spectrum of ratings AAA-CCC in each year is reported in Table 1.
These show some variation between years, but the proportion of rms in each rating category seems
to be quite stable. That does not imply, however, that there are no transitions between categories.
4.2 Firm-specic characteristics
Rating agencies use both qualitative and quantitative analysis to assess the business and nancial
risks of xed-income issuers (see Fitch (2006) and van Gestel et al. (2007)). In our empirical model
we follow both the ratings agencies' practice and the recent literature (e.g Amato & Furne (2004)
and van Gestel et al. (2007)) in measuring these risks using the explanatory variables such as
protability, cash ow, liquidity, nancial leverage, performance, solvency, and size.
The rst two measures are based on earnings. The rst is a measure of earnings before interest
and taxes over total sales (PROF) which is a measure of the protability of the rm, the second is
a measure of the resources the rm is able to generate from its operations relative to its total assets
6Rosch (2005) and van Gestel et al. (2007) are exceptions in this regard.
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which is also known as cash ow (CF). Higher protability and greater cash ow would improve the
credit rating. The liquidity variable (LIQ) indicates the cash from operations relative to liabilities,
and would also improve the credit rating if it were to increase. The next two measures indicate the
scale of the rms liabilities. Leverage (LEV) dened as total debt over total assets, which indicates
the overall indebtedness of the rm, and the interest coverage ratio (COV), as measured by earnings
before interest and taxes to interest paid, assesses the rm's net indebtedness and the cost of debt
servicing. Higher leverage implies a weaker balance sheet, therefore we expect this measure to
have an adverse eect on credit ratings, but higher coverage indicates the opposite. Solvency ratio
(SOLV) measures the common equity to total asset ratio. An increase in this variable improves the
credit rating. Finally, real total sales (SIZE) indicates the scale of the rm and would be expected
to improve the rating. To make our results comparable with previous studies we take three-year
averages. Since this takes into account the past nancial conditions of the rms that are being rated
and not just present conditions, it builds in some persistence into the rm-specic characteristics
and should allow our models to replicate some features of credit ratings `through the cycle'.
Table 2 provides a correlation matrix for the rm characteristics and the rating of the rm. It
demonstrates that the characteristics have relatively low correlations with each other. In addition,
the negative correlation between the credit ratings and protability, cash ow, liquidity, coverage,
solvency and size reect the tendency for rms to obtain better ratings when they display healthy
balance sheets. The opposite sign between credit ratings and leverage shows that highly indebted
rms tend to attract worse ratings. This conrms that ratings are correlated with the indicators
of creditworthiness on the balance sheet that investors expect ratings to measure.
Table 3 provides correlation information for lagged categories of ratings and initial ratings.
There is some evidence that lagged ratings and initial ratings in the same category are positively
correlated, presumably because there are rms that do not make transitions from their initial rating.
Potentially the high correlation could result in multicolinearity in the equations where lagged and
initial ratings are included together, therefore, in order to avoid drawing all our conclusions from
models where this could be the case, we compare several dierent specications in our results where
lagged and initial ratings are included separately.
Table 4 reports summary statistics of our explanatory variables. We observe that rms belonging
to the investment grade spectrum (BBB and above) have higher prot margins, higher cash ow
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values, are more liquid, less leveraged, have higher coverage ratios, more solvent and larger compared
to high yield rms (below BBB).
5 Results
In this section we report the estimation results.
5.1 The linear probit model
The rst column of Table 5 reports our baseline model, which we refer to as model 1. We will later
compare the performance of other models against this baseline. The result shows that, with the
exception of the measure of leverage, an increase in all linear terms in the rm-specic variables
improves the credit rating (they have signicant negative coecients which predicts a better rating
category with a lower number). As protability, cash ow, interest coverage, liquidity and solvency
improve and as the rm has higher total sales so the rm receives a better predicted rating as
expected. Leverage has a positive eect, worsening the credit rating as we might expect. Model 1
has an R2 of 0.26.
5.2 The non-linear probit model
Results for the nonlinear model (model 2) due to van Gestel et al. (2007) are presented in the second
column of Table 5. The nonlinear terms apply the hyperbolic tangent transformation to variables
to oor the impact of large negative or positive values of the variables on the predicted rating. We
rst check whether the non-linear terms are signicant by determining whether the coecients can
be restricted to zero. The non-linear transformations of coverage (NLCOV) and liquidity (NLLIQ)
reject this hypothesis with a p-value of 0.92 for joint hypothesis that the coecients are zero. The
nonlinear model has similar signs and signicance of the linear terms for coverage and liquidity.
Nonlinear terms are strongly signicant and have negative coecients, while linear terms retain
their signs and signicance. The eect of the nonlinear terms raises the R2 from 0.26 to 0.27. This
indicates that minor improvement in the t of the model is achieved with the addition of nonlinear
terms, but the predictions of ratings reported later show a larger improvement.
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5.3 Momentum, ageing and drift
Columns three through ve in Table 5 oer an indication of the importance of momentum (model
3), ageing (model 4) and drift (model 5), described earlier in the paper. Carty & Fons (1993)
were the rst authors to note that a rm's rating depended on whether the rm had previously
been upgraded or downgraded. They concluded that rms that had been downgraded were more
likely to see subsequent downgrades, while rms that had been upgraded were not more likely to be
upgraded. The results in column 3 uphold these ndings. The dummy variable indicating that rms
have had a previous upgrade has a negatively signed coecient, but it is not signicantly dierent
from zero, while a dummy variable indicating that rms that have had a previous downgrade has a
positively signed coecient, which is signicant. There seems to be some evidence for momentum
along the lines of Carty & Fons (1993) in our sample. There is also evidence of ageing. When we
allow for the number of periods in the previous rating state, following a change in the rating state,
we nd that this variable has a negative and signicant coecient (reported in column four, Table
5). This means that the rating improves with the length of time in the previous rating state, which
conrms evidence of ageing identied by Carty & Fons (1993), Lando & Skodeberg (2002) and
Kavvathas (2001). Finally, we consider evidence of drift, which can be a result of variations in the
standards of ratings agencies in assigning ratings or a variation in credit quality of rms seeking
ratings over time, (see Blume et al. (1998), Cantor & Mann (2003) and Amato & Furne (2004)).
We report the coecient on the dierence in the percentage of rms experiencing an upgrade
minus the percentage of rms experiencing a downgrade for each calendar year. We nd that the
estimated coecients are signicant for all but 2002, and all signicant variables are positive and
increasing in magnitude, implying that there is a tendency for ratings to worsen over time. This
oers support for Blume et al. (1998) but it is not clear whether this is due to stricter ratings by
agencies, or a deterioration in credit quality of rms being rated. Despite the strong evidence in
favor of momentum, ageing and drift, we nd that it adds almost nothing to the goodness of t for
these rating probit models.
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5.4 Allowing for state dependence in ratings
Lando & Skodeberg (2002), Kavvathas (2001), Behar & Nagpal (1999) and Bangia et al. (2002)
note that the rating transition is dependent on the previous rating category. We now introduce
initial and lagged values of the rating for each rm in to allow for state dependence and initial
conditions in results reported in Table 6. In columns one and two (models 6 and 7) we report the
probit model when we allow for lagged and initial ratings separately and without other variables
present, then in column three we report their impact when both lagged and initial ratings are
included in the model, with no other variables in the equation (model 8). Then, in columns four,
ve and six, we report their impact with rm-specic variables included (models 9, 10 and 11).
Finally, we report a model where we allow for the average of the past three years ratings instead
of the rating in the previous period (model 12). This provides a range of results that allow us to
determine the relative importance of lagged and initial rating data, which provide evidence for a
type of momentum in models of ratings. All the models include some element of state dependence
and it remains to be seen whether these models improve on the predictions of the models in Table
5.
The ndings in these columns show that the previous or initial ratings are signicant predictors
of current rating in nearly every case. A positive and signicant coecient on the lagged rating
(relative to the baseline rating of A) means that the rm with this rating in the previous period is
predicted to have a rating this period with a higher ordinal value than A this period. (We recall
that higher ordinal values are associated with lower ratings.) The opposite is true for negative
coecients. So rms with AAA-AA ratings in the previous period(s) are predicted to have ratings
above A, and rms with BBB ratings or below in the previous period(s) are predicted to have ratings
below A. Because these numbers are larger negative numbers for rms with AAA-AA ratings versus
those with A ratings they will have correspondingly lower predicted ratings i.e. ratings that are
higher on the rating scale.
We compare these models with two models that allow for state dependence in the rating - based
on rst lagged and initial ratings and an average of lagged ratings over the previous three years,
and the initial rating. The estimates are similar to those reported in the previous columns in the
following respects. We observe that linear and nonlinear variables retain their signs and signicance
21
in most cases. The variables are not as strongly signicant as they were in other models, which
suggests that some of their signicance in the previous model resulted from state dependence in the
ratings, which is now measured directly by the lagged rating and the initial rating. Nevertheless
the linear and nonlinear terms do not lose all their signicance in every case, and we retain these
variables in our model. We also nd that the lagged dependent variables - included to formally test
for state dependence - are highly statistically signicant. Therefore we conclude that the previous
state matters for the prediction of the rating today, and if a rm was rated below investment grade
in t  1 it is predicted to remain in the high-yield spectrum in the current period; similarly, being
rated as investment grade in the previous period increases the probability of being rated as an
investment grade issuer in the current year. As we will see later this prediction is almost always
a correct prediction. When we consider the eect of the average rating in periods t   1; t   2 and
t  3 in place of the lagged rating, we nd a similar result.
The coecients on lagged and average ratings show a similar gradient in the magnitude of the
coecient as one moves from a previous rating status of CC to AAA-AA. Embedding this state
dependence through the previous rating or the average rating of the three previous years oers a
substantial improvement in the t of the model. So rms with AAA-AA ratings in the previous
period(s) are predicted to have ratings above A, and rms with BBB ratings or below in the previous
period(s) are predicted to have ratings below A. The estimated coecients for the initial period
observations are also highly signicant. They show similar characteristics to the previous period
rating for rms with initial ratings above A, since the coecients are negative and larger negative
numbers as the initial rating improves. Below A, rms with BB initial ratings and B-CC initial
ratings have worse predicted ratings than those with an initial A rating, while BBB rated rms
appear to have better predicted ratings.
Models with state dependence have higher R2 values than models without state dependence,
but we now compare the predictive performance in- and out-of-sample using root mean squared
errors, Diebold Mariano statistics and in contingency tables.
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6 Predictions
6.1 In-sample predictions
We begin by evaluating the forecasts for the models presented in Table 5. We report in Table
7, columns one to three, Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE) as well as values for the Diebold-
Mariano and the Harvey-Leybourne-Newbold statistics, compared to the baseline model (model 1)
in Table 5. The results suggest that model 3 displays the smallest RMSE and there is evidence
of a statistically signicant dierence between model 1, which is the baseline model, and models
2, 3 and 4 and 5. According to the DM and HLN tests, only models 2, 3 have superior predictive
ability than the linear baseline model. In columns one through three of Table 8 we show RMSE
and values for DM and HLN statistics for the models presented in Table 6. On the basis of the
above mentioned statistics, there is signicant dierence in the performance of all models versus
the baseline model. Thus all models (except model 6) reported in Table 6 perform better than the
baseline model. The model with state dependence (model 11) displays the smallest RMSE and is
signicantly superior to the baseline model.
For the model with the smallest RMSE (model 11, with state dependence, shown in Table 6)
we present a contingency table where one can compare predicted ratings to actual ratings. The
outcome of this exercise is shown in Table 9. Reading across each row gives the number of predicted
observations per category against the actual outcome in the leftmost column. For example, the rst
row shows the number of observations with actual rating of AAA-AA, while the second row shows
those with rating A etc. To correctly evaluate the predictive ability of our model we employ two
dierent statistics, SC and CP. The model correctly predicts AAA-AA 62 times, A 394 times, BBB
586 times, BB 306 times and B-CC 318 times. There are 949 occasions when the correct prediction
is made, hence we nd that the SC= 1666/1685, which suggests that we have approximately 98
percent correct predictions. The outcome of this exercise needs to account for the inuence of
the dominant outcome by reporting the Merton correct predictions statistic. This test calculates
correct predictions using the proportion of correct predictions for each of the ve rating categories.
This test produces CP= 0.97 for the model with state dependence. Comparing this result with
other authors' results we nd Blume et al. (1998) ordered probit model for bond issuers from 1978-
1995 had scores of SC=0.57 and CP=0.30 while Amato & Furne (2004) had similar scores of
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SC=0.52 and CP=0.26 for the model of bond issuing forms for data from 1984-2001 with time
dummies included. The main conclusion that can be drawn from this exercise is that credit ratings
are indeed highly autocorrelated and previous years' ratings are a key variable when predicting
current ratings in-sample.
6.2 Out-of-sample predictions
This section presents out-of-sample predictions of ratings using the past and current information
available up to time T. We use an expanding window method, which allows the successive obser-
vations to be included in the initial sample prior to forecast of the next one-step ahead prediction
of the rating while keeping the start date of the sample xed. By this method, we forecast future
ratings q^t+1, q^t+2 etc. The initial estimation window is 2000 to 2004 and the rst prediction date
is year 2005. We then increase T by one each time until T reaches year 2007.
Columns four, ve and six of Table 7 report RMSE and values for DM and HLN statistics for
models in Table 5. We are able to reject the null hypothesis of equal forecasting performance in
all four models. Specically, models 2 and 3 are signicantly better in terms of forecasting ratings
than the baseline model. Table 8 reports the relative performance using RMSE, DM and HLN
statistics comparing models with the baseline model for models in Table 6. We identify ve out
of seven cases where there is evidence of signicant dierence between the baseline model and the
competing models. Once again the model with state dependence (model 11) displays the highest
DM statistic value and the lowest RMSE.7
Table 10 illustrates the contingency table of the predicted against actual outcome out-of-sample
results for the model with state dependence. As with the in-sample results, the predictive ability
of the out-of-sample predictions is upheld when lagged values of ratings and initial ratings are
included, since SC=0.94 per cent and the Merton correct prediction statistic indicates CP=0.93.
The prediction out-of-sample is remarkably good, and shows that state dependence is a feature of
ratings that helps forecasts.
7We have also tested the model with state dependence versus all other competing models. According to both DM
and HLN statistics, the model with state dependence is signicantly better in terms of forecasting ratings.
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7 Conclusion
Many models of the relationship between credit ratings and a rm's nancial characteristics have
used a linear probit model. In this paper we introduce nonlinear terms and allow ratings to vary
due to ageing, momentum and drift. We then introduce state dependence in the form of lagged and
initial ratings. The resulting model shows that non-linearities and state dependence terms improve
the t of a model seeking to determine a rm's credit rating. When we analyze the ability of such
a model to predict ratings we nd that in-sample and out-of-sample the model with non-linearities
and state dependence predicts much better than the baseline linear probit model. It appears that
allowing for state dependence oers greater gains than allowing for non-linearities alone (although
these oer some improvement in prediction) oering an SC score that is correct 98 percent of the
time, and a CP score correct 97 percent of the time. The state-dependent model has the best
performance evaluated by a Diebold-Mariano statistic. When we compare the performance of the
model with state dependence out-of-sample we nd that its performance does not deteriorate very
much. It is correct on a SC basis 94 percent of the time, and on a CP basis 93 percent of the
time out-of-sample, allowing for predictions one year ahead for three years 2005-2007; once again
this model is superior according to the Diebold-Mariano statistic. We conclude that the use of
information on the initial condition of the rating of the rm and the last observation of its actual
rating helps the model correctly predict the rating more often than a model that excludes this
information.
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Table 1: Ratings per year
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC Observations
2000 2 8 40 72 34 34 4 194
2001 2 7 51 85 40 37 4 226
2002 2 7 55 83 44 33 7 231
2003 2 7 53 83 46 45 7 243
2004 1 7 53 92 48 51 6 258
2005 1 7 54 88 47 46 6 249
2006 1 7 55 86 42 37 4 232
2007 1 7 42 80 42 37 3 212
Observations 12 57 403 669 343 320 41 1845
Notes: The table presents the distribution of rms' ratings by year based on a panel of rms from 2000 through 2007.
Table 2: Correlation matrix for ratings and rm-specic creditworthiness indicators
RATING PROF CF LIQ LEV COV SOLV SIZE
RATING 1.00
PROF -0.23 1.00
CF -0.43 0.04 1.00
LIQ -0.21 -0.01 0.21 1.00
LEV 0.55 0.04 -0.28 -0.35 1.00
COV -0.56 0.42 0.56 0.29 -0.46 1.00
SOLV -0.44 0.18 0.32 0.33 -0.75 0.42 1.00
SIZE -0.43 0.12 -0.19 0.07 -0.46 0.31 0.14 1.00
Notes: The table presents correlations. PROF= Earnings before interest and taxes over total sales, CF= Funds from operations
to total assets, LIQ= Cash from operations to total liabilities, COV= Operating prots to interest expenses, LEV= Total debt
over total assets, SOLV= Common equity over total assets, SIZE= Log of real total sales.
Table 3: Correlation matrix for lagged and initial ratings
AAA AA 1 A 1 BBB 1 BB 1 B   CC 1 AAA AA(1) A(1) BBB(1) BB(1) B   CC(1)
AAA AA 1 1.00
A 1 -0.10 1.00
BBB 1 -0.14 -0.38 1.00
BB 1 -0.09 -0.25 -0.35 1.00
B   CC 1 -0.09 -0.25 -0.35 -0.24 1.00
AAA AA(1) 0.85 -0.06 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 1.00
A(1) -0.05 0.93 -0.36 -0.24 -0.24 -0.10 1.00
BBB(1) -0.13 -0.35 0.95 -0.34 -0.35 -0.15 -0.36 1.00
BB(1) -0.09 -0.22 -0.32 0.90 -0.23 -0.10 -0.24 -0.33 1.00
B   CC(1) -0.09 -0.25 -0.35 -0.15 0.90 -0.10 -0.24 -0.35 -0.23 1.00
Notes: The table presents correlations. The one period lags of the ratings are reported as AAA-AA 1 etc. The initial period
observations are reported as AAA-AA(1) etc.
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Table 4: Summary statistics
Mean 0.25 Median 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PROF
AAA AA 18.69 11.58 19.85 24.15
A 14.08 8.16 11.69 18.40
BBB 11.06 5.96 9.77 14.48
BB 11.21 4.11 10.11 14.48
B   CC 8.48 2.91 7.18 13.03
Total 11.55 5.45 10.16 16.01
CF
AAA AA 16.67 13.89 17.29 20.01
A 12.07 8.91 11.66 15.11
BBB 10.67 7.15 10.27 13.75
BB 9.69 6.03 8.63 12.63
B   CC 6.84 3.70 6.05 9.45
Total 10.29 6.35 9.82 9.45
LIQ
AAA AA 21.82 7.33 14.57 32.58
A 13.28 3.38 8.38 16.42
BBB 12.85 2.86 6.91 15.50
BB 9.86 2.15 5.11 11.94
B   CC 8.67 1.20 4.03 11.05
Total 11.92 2.47 6.48 14.88
LEV
AAA AA 18.34 10.18 15.29 24.52
A 25.18 16.81 23.34 31.91
BBB 26.85 18.34 26.32 34.36
BB 36.90 25.13 34.55 46.21
B   CC 46.44 30.03 44.01 56.37
Total 31.84 19.50 28.75 40.77
COV
AAA AA 13.81 9.72 12.81 16.36
A 7.52 4.67 6.54 8.82
BBB 5.63 3.49 4.66 6.52
BB 4.08 2.61 3.49 4.41
B   CC 3.22 1.70 2.21 4.34
Total 5.61 2.97 4.44 6.91
SOLV
AAA AA 43.39 39.33 45.92 51.71
A 36.89 28.35 38.25 45.98
BBB 37.77 29.36 38.12 46.39
BB 29.25 21.03 32.30 41.02
B   CC 21.92 9.98 21.84 37.77
Total 33.12 23.55 35.65 44.32
SIZE
AAA AA 10.55 10.01 10.43 10.94
A 9.52 8.37 9.04 9.86
BBB 9.11 8.37 9.04 9.86
BB 8.56 7.94 8.48 9.31
B   CC 8.47 7.79 8.51 9.20
Total 9.03 8.28 8.99 9.81
Notes: The table presents percentiles of the distributions for each of the following variables: PROF= Earnings before interest
and taxes over total sales, CF= Funds from operations to total assets, LIQ= Cash from operations to total liabilities, COV=
Operating prots to interest expenses, LEV= Total debt over total assets, SOLV= Common equity over total assets, SIZE=
Log of real total sales.
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Table 5: Prediction of corporate default ratings
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PROF -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.022***
(-5.72) (-4.36) (-4.41) (-4.58) (-4.36)
CF -0.027*** -0.014** -0.014* -0.015** -0.014**
(-3.80) (-1.98) (-1.87) (-1.99) (-1.98)
LIQ -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008***
(-3.22) (-2.93) (-2.94) (-2.79) (-2.93)
LEV 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(6.28) (4.56) (4.52) (4.64) (4.56)
COV -0.054*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.062*** -0.064***
(-4.39) (-5.23) (-5.27) (-5.13) (-5.23)
SOLV -0.006** -0.005** -0.006** -0.005* -0.005**
(-2.43) (-1.99) (-2.03) (-1.96) (-1.99)
SIZE -0.553*** -0.531*** -0.534*** -0.534*** -0.531***
(-16.53) (-15.61) (-15.70) (-15.79) (-15.61)
NLCOV -6.281*** -6.266*** -6.027*** -6.281***
(-5.34) (-5.28) (-5.13) (-5.34)
NLLIQ -0.849*** -0.855*** -0.854*** -0.849***
(-4.91) (-4.94) (-5.02) (-4.91)
PREV UPGR -0.314
(-0.74)
PREV DNGR 0.632**
(2.17)
AGEING -0.078**
(-1.98)
DRIFT2002 -0.029
(-0.24)
DRIFT2003 0.147*
(1.74)
DRIFT2004 0.290***
(2.91)
DRIFT2005 0.321***
(2.75)
DRIFT2006 0.464***
(3.95)
DRIFT2007 0.482***
(4.06)
Observations 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842
R2 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
Notes: The table presents ordered probit estimation results. The left-hand side variable is the credit rating of a rm. In the
analysis AAA-AA ratings are assigned a `1' , A a `2' , and so on until CC ratings, which are assigned a `5'. The one period lags
of the ratings are reported as AAA-AA 1 etc. The initial period observations are reported as AAA-AA(1) etc. Time dummies
and industry dummies were included in all specications. Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. * signicant at
10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 6: State dependence and initial ratings
Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PROF -0.005 -0.015*** -0.019* 0.013
(-0.66) (-3.30) (-1.87) (1.25)
CF 0.013 -0.033*** -0.013 -0.062***
(0.65) (-5.07) (-0.96) (-3.62)
LIQ -0.007** -0.006** -0.008** -0.002
(-2.04) (-2.41) (-2.00) (-0.45)
LEV 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.022** 0.029***
(2.92) (3.33) (2.44) (3.63)
COV -0.060*** -0.017 -0.019 0.016
(-3.30) (-1.46) (-0.92) (0.63)
SOLV 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.003
(0.64) (0.13) (1.04) (0.41)
SIZE -0.073 -0.385*** -0.234*** -0.253***
(-0.99) (-8.71) (-3.47) (-3.16)
NLCOV -7.338*** -6.144** -5.987* -4.320*
(-2.62) (-2.16) (-1.76) (-1.83)
NLLIQ 0.037 -0.507** -0.369 -0.604
(0.25) (-2.29) (-1.60) (-1.48)
AAA AA 1 -10.150*** -9.554*** -10.023*** -9.561***
(-21.91) (-37.31) (-30.13) (-37.00)
BBB 1 3.922*** 5.227*** 3.921*** 5.586***
(9.51) (6.03) (9.42) (6.83)
BB 1 7.761*** 5.285*** 7.693*** 5.250***
(9.84) (5.15) (9.79) (5.28)
B   CC 1 18.357*** 19.594*** 18.527*** 20.153***
(21.90) (11.36) (19.12) (11.31)
AAA AA(1) -2.627*** -1.310 -2.238*** -1.470* 1.788*
(-7.32) (-1.58) (-5.98) (-1.95) (1.77)
BBB(1) 1.957*** -0.625 1.899*** -0.964* 0.700
(12.80) (-0.94) (12.77) (-1.74) (1.21)
BB(1) 3.974*** 3.777*** 3.780*** 3.868*** 4.589***
(14.44) (4.00) (13.96) (4.07) (7.36)
B   CC(1) 6.926*** 6.887*** 6.926*** 7.290*** 6.282***
(18.89) (4.00) (19.26) (3.99) (5.84)
AV ER:AAA AA 1 -7.053***
(-6.62)
AV ER:BBB 1 4.392***
(7.98)
AV ER:BB 1 5.375***
(7.47)
AV ER:B   CC 1 14.023***
(13.34)
Observations 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,688 1,842 1,688 1,688
R2 0.90 0.63 0.92 0.91 0.68 0.94 0.93
Notes: The table presents ordered probit estimation results. The left-hand side variable is the credit rating of a rm. In the
analysis AAA-AA ratings are assigned a `1' , A a `2' , and so on until CC ratings, which are assigned a `5' . The one period lags
of the ratings are reported as AAA-AA 1 etc. The initial period observations are reported as AAA-AA(1) etc. Time dummies
and industry dummies were included in all specications. Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. * signicant at
10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 7: Root mean squared errors, Diebold-Mariano and Harvey-Leybourne-Newbold tests for comparing the
predictive accuracy of the models presented in Table 5
In-sample Out-of-sample
RMSE DM HLN RMSE DM HLN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model1 0.051 - - 0.041 - -
Model2 0.047 3.56*** 2.90** 0.033 1.75* 1.29
Model3 0.044 14.22*** 11.60*** 0.031 6.76*** 5.52***
Model4 0.065 -7.39*** -6.03*** 0.057 -3.50*** -2.86**
Model5 0.092 -5.52*** -4.50*** 0.103 -4.22*** -3.48***
Notes: The table reports root mean squared errors as well as values of the DM and HLN statistics. * signicant at 10%; **
signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
Table 8: Root mean squared errors, Diebold-Mariano and Harvey-Leybourne-Newbold tests for comparing the
predictive accuracy of the models presented in Table 6
In-sample Out-of-sample
RMSE DM HLN RMSE DM HLN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model6 0.413 -2.13** -1.74* 0.044 -0.27 -0.22
Model7 0.043 10.26*** 8.37*** 0.040 0.15 0.12
Model8 0.034 12.13*** 9.89*** 0.036 2.14** 1.75*
Model9 0.037 10.50*** 8.57*** 0.036 1.98** 1.61
Model10 0.036 7.24*** 5.91*** 0.034 1.86* 1.52
Model11 0.033 12.34*** 10.06*** 0.030 3.09*** 2.47**
Model12 0.034 13.97*** 10.80*** 0.033 2.11** 1.72*
Notes: The table reports root mean squared errors as well as values of the DM and HLN statistics. * signicant at 10%; **
signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 9: In-sample predictions - model with state-dependence
Actual Rating Predicted Rating
AAA-AA A BBB BB B-CC Total
AAA AA 62 0 0 0 0 62
A 2 394 7 0 0 403
BBB 0 1 586 3 0 590
BB 0 0 2 306 1 309
B   CC 0 0 1 2 318 321
Total 64 395 596 311 319 1,685
SC = 0:98; CP = 0:97
Notes: The table reports in-sample predictions. The leftmost column shows actual ratings while the righthand side columns
show the prediction of the model with persistence.
Table 10: Out-of-sample predictions- model with state-dependence
Actual Rating Predicted Rating
AAA-AA A BBB BB B-CC Total
AAA AA 32 0 0 0 0 32
A 1 179 24 0 0 204
BBB 0 1 329 12 0 342
BB 0 0 2 170 8 180
B   CC 0 0 1 5 181 188
Total 33 200 345 181 187 946
SC = 0:94; CP = 0:93
Notes: The table reports out-of-sample predictions. The leftmost column shows actual ratings while the righthand side
columns show the prediction of the model with persistence.
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